The Credit Bureaus are moving towards a new standard to protect personal identity information in credit reports.

Experian has adapted the PCI-DSS and renamed it Experian Independent Third Party Assessment (EI3PA). Trans Union and Equifax are expected to follow suit.

The EI3PA is an annual assessment of a reseller’s ability to protect the Experian-provided personal sensitive information. It also has quarterly scans for network vulnerabilities. Although similar to the PCI DSS, and QSAs will be doing the assessments, approval comes from Experian only, not from a card issuer or issuing bank.

LA Mayor Villaraigosa has unveiled a “Give Me 3″ Bike Safety Poster

The Mayor also announced that he would like to “make the 3 Foot Passing Rule a 3 Foot Passing Law” in California. He will be introducing the bill, going to Sacramento and working with the bicycling community to ensure that this becomes a reality. “We’ll keep at it until it becomes part of the California Vehicle Code.”

LA has to be one of the most bike unfriendly cities anywhere. When I lived there many years ago it was common for bike lanes to end abruptly at the intersection with eight lanes of freeway, and no way to get across. Apparently the very first LA Bicycle Summit was just held this year. Excellent to see them take (three?) steps to at least make bicycling safer.

The Google Online Security Blog has posted an interesting update in response to an IBM 2010 Risk Report.

…we were confused by a claim that 33% of critical and high-risk bugs uncovered in our services in the first half of 2010 were left unpatched. We learned after investigating that the 33% figure referred to a single unpatched vulnerability out of a total of three — and importantly, the one item that was considered unpatched was only mistakenly considered a security vulnerability due to a terminology mix-up. As a result, the true unpatched rate for these high-risk bugs is 0 out of 2, or 0%.

IBM has an updated chart now. Although one can see how Google might take such a sensitive and defensive position when confronted with vulnerability data, their analysis comes across as shockingly one-sided.

They first highlight four “factors working against [vulnerability databases]“. All have a clear tone of “don’t trust those databases” but only one says the vendors have an important role — disclosure in consistent formats. The finger-pointing then goes a step further with two suggestions:

To make these databases more useful for the industry and less likely to spread misinformation, we feel there must be more frequent collaboration between vendors and compilers. As a first step, database compilers should reach out to vendors they plan to cover in order to devise a sustainable solution for both parties that will allow for a more consistent flow of information. Another big improvement would be increased transparency on the part of the compilers — for example, the inclusion of more hard data, the methodology behind the data gathering, and caveat language acknowledging the limitations of the presented data.

I think calling the report misinformation is a bit harsh. Their post only says databases are not to be trusted because the “compilers” do not reach out and are not transparent enough. That should be a two-way commentary. There is no need to place all blame on database researchers and none on vendors like Google. Google could publish more patch information and transparency with regard to its recorded vulnerabilities. They could lead by example, of course, and fix their their security communication and management issues, especially around consistency. That might be the third, but most important, step to make these databases more useful.

BitDefender says they have a survey that shows over 30% of users who accepted a friendship with a bogus profile are in the IT Security industry.

Although it would be cool to jump into this statistic, I do not see any analysis or data on the users that proves they were not faking their own profile.

Turnabout is fair play, no? How much of this information that BitDefender collected is real?

The study sample group included 2,000 users from all over the world registered on one of the most popular social networks. These users were randomly chosen in order to cover different aspects: sex (1,000 females, 1,000 males), age (the sample ranged from 17 to 65 years with a mean age of 27.3 years), professional affiliation, interests etc. In the first step, the users were only requested to add the unknown test profile as their friend, while in the second step several conversations with randomly selected users aimed to determine what kind of details they would disclose.

Ironic that they would assume it can be trusted. Or did they verify? The complete 400K report does not give any verification of the survey group, so maybe we can assume they also could have been duped while they were trying to dupe others. The closest thing I found was this note:

These outcomes were tested against the motivation of IT security industry users to become friends with the blonde girl, in order to ensure that they didn’t accept the friendship request just to have “study material” for their own research.

That means they asked the person they were trying to befriend for their motivation; 53% said “a lovely face” was their reason to accept the girl. Was this a game response or sincere? I don’t see it as validation.

The experiment revealed that the most vulnerable users appeared to be those that worked in the IT industry: after a half an hour conversation, 10% of them disclosed to “the blonde face” personal sensitive information such as: address, phone number, mother’s and father’s name, etc — information usually used in recovery passwords questions. In addition to that, after a 2 hour conversation, 73% revealed what appears to be confidential information from their work place, such as future strategies, plans, and unreleased technologies/software.

Two hour conversation with a fake profile. That’s impressive but I still would like to see validation results. I mean what percentage of those claiming to work in IT were proven/verified to actually work in IT. Did they divulge real or fake information? When a study begins with a premise that you can easily fool people online, it would seem logical to then proceed with caution and not believe everything a new contact might say.

Quick reminder to acquirers — just one month remains until the deadline.

Visa warned in 2008 that to avoid “appropriate risk controls, up to and including fines” you must provide them a PCI DSS Attestation of Compliance for all Level 1 merchants by the end of September 2010.

Sprites mods has a very nice in-depth hardware security review of the Disk Genie hard drive. The first problem seems to be how easily the device is opened. The next failure comes from how it indicates failures to the attacker. Spoiler alert: here are the conclusions.

If you’re just a generic Joe Blow who wants to make sure your private pictures don’t get viewed by your collegues or kids, you’re golden. The fact that the there’s no way a software-only attack can get the pincode means that some hardware-experience is needed to start hacking the device, and that will deter casual onlookers enough to make the device completely safe for curious neighbours or collegues, even if they are smart enough to, for example, install a keylogger on your PC.

If you’re a business-person with actual info to hide, info that could financially benefit other parties… you can still use this, but make sure to pick a strong pincode. More than 11 digits should do, depending on how badly others want the data.

If you’re, say, the president of a nuclear country and want to use this to carry around the launch codes of your nukes, I wouldn’t recommend this device. While the thing is safe for a casual hacker like me, someone with money or the resources to de-cap chips can probably get to the data fairly easy: the PIC which contains the keys to the HD is not a secure device and when decapped under a microscope in a laboratory can probably be made to give up that key fairly easily.

Is that a qualified hint to the Pentagon or just an example?

The California Attorney Jerry Brown has filed charges against e-waste recycler’s execs

In late 2008, CalRecycle auditors contacted investigators at the California Department of Toxic Substances Control after noticing discrepancies in the claims submitted by Tung Tai and the records kept by Golden State Records and Recycling, a company that collected and transferred materials to Tung Tai, Brown said in the release.

In July 2009, state agents searched the Tung Tai facility and discovered two separate sets of records, Brown said. Those records showed that Tung Tai had significantly inflated the pounds of recycled material it submitted for reimbursement to CalRecycle between January and September 2008, Brown’s office said.

Two separate sets of records? That is pretty bold.